The relevance of relativistic mechanics to natural language semantics

Synthese, forthcoming

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Abstract Situated language and cognition arguably can concern aspects of their environs without mentally representing them. Recently, I have argued that cognition and language can also concern remote situations, as well as general states of affairs, without mental representation. I have illustrated this with thought experiments involving a hypothetical people called the Sundial tribe. As I argue in the present article, such phenomena are not merely a theoretical possibility, but occur routinely in real, ordinary English: Distances and durations are relative to frames of reference, but ordinary English speakers either do not know this, or ignore it in practice. Nevertheless, people can routinely communicate in ordinary English about distances and durations as measured relative to Earth, despite not representing Earth as the frame of reference. Furthermore, provided that we can travel to Mars, ordinary English as we know it will enable us to communicate about distances and durations relative to multiple planets at once, as well as to generalize across heavenly bodies, without mentally representing the relevant reference frames. Our capacity to think and talk without representation therefore does not reduce to our capacity for context-bound, situated cognition, but goes beyond it. The suggested explanation is as follows: (1) situated cognition is fit or adapted to particular environs; (2) these particular environs often instantiate broader patterns, whether natural or artificial ones; and (3) when we encounter additional instances of these patterns, we can often deal with them effectively, in the same way as we deal with the original ones.

Displacement and quantification without representation

Mind & Language, 41 (3): 1-19. 2025

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Abstract Perry and Recanati have argued that thought and speech can concern entities that they do not represent. This is possible because speakers and thinkers are pragmatically situated within their environs. I argue that thought and speech can go much farther than that. Consider a semi-nomadic tribe who tell the time only by sundials, and who say such things as, “Everywhere we go, we dine at 7”. Their speech and cognition can thus transcend the local environment, and concern remote entities without the aid of either representation, or the context of utterance, or that of assessment.

Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action

Philosophical Explorations, 28 (1): 68-84. 2024

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Abstract Since Donald Davidson issued his challenge to anticausalism in 1963, most philosophers have espoused the view that our actions are causally explained by the reasons why we do them. This Davidsonian consensus, however, rests on a faulty argument. Davidson’s challenge has been met, in more than one way, by anticausalists such as C. Ginet, G. Wilson, and S. Sehon. Hence I endeavor to support causalism with a stronger argument. Our actions are correlated with our motivating reasons; to wit, we often do what we have reason to do. In yet other words, we are often rational. Our frequent rationality is easily explained if causalism is correct, but looks like a staggering coincidence otherwise. Anticausalism thus appears to be ill-equipped to account for the very existence of rational behavior, and so far no attempts in this direction have succeeded.

Teleological functional explanations: a new naturalist synthesis

Acta Biotheoretica, 72 (5):1–22 (2024)

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Abstract The etiological account of teleological function is beset by several difficulties, which I propose to solve by grafting onto the etiological theory a subordinated goal-contribution clause. This approach enables us to ascribe neither too many teleofunctions nor too few; to give a unitary, one-clause analysis that works just as well for teleological functions derived from Darwinian evolution, as for those derived from human intention; and finally, to save the etiological theory from falsification, by explaining how, in spite of appearances, the theory can allow for evolutionary function loss.

Making sense of ‘genetic programs’: biomolecular Post–Newell production systems

Biology and Philosophy, 39 (2): 1-12. 2024

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Abstract The biomedical literature makes extensive use of the concept of a genetic program. So far, however, the nature of genetic programs has received no satisfactory elucidation from the standpoint of computer science. This unsettling omission has led to doubts about the very existence of genetic programs, on the grounds that gene regulatory networks lack a predetermined schedule of execution, which may seem to contradict the very idea of a program. I show, however, that we can make perfect sense of genetic programs, if only we abandon the preconception that all computers have a von Neumann architecture. Instead, genetic programs instantiate the computational architecture of Post–Newell Production Systems. That is, genetic programs are unordered sets of conditional instructions, instructions that fire independently when their conditions are matched. For illustration I present a paradigm Production System that regulates the functioning of the well-known lac operon of E. coli. On close reflection it turns out that not only genes, but also proteins encode instructions. I propose, therefore, to rename genetic programs to biomolecular programs. Biomolecular and/or genetic programs, and the cellular computers than run them, are to be understood not as von Neumann computers, but as Post–Newell production systems.

‘Note on the individuation of biological traits’

Journal of Philosophy, 115:215–221, 2018

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Abstract Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. Nanay replies that these lineages cannot be individuated except by reference to functional categories. Worryingly, Neander and Rosenberg themselves have previously argued persuasively that homology often depends on function. This article addresses their arguments and shows how to escape them: Regardless whether the arguments are right about long-term homological categories, they do not apply to generation-to-generation homology. The latter, moreover, is sufficient for individuating the lineages needed to explain teleological functions.

‘A counterexample to variabilism’

Analysis, 76(1):26–29, 2016

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Abstract Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants, but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counterexample to this view.

Keywords proper names, semantics, donkey anaphora, discourse binding

‘Objective truth in matters of taste’

Philosophical Studies, 173(7):1755–1777, 2016

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Abstract In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.

Keywords disagreement, relativism, contextualism, natural language semantics, linguistic intuitions, truth values

‘Stained glass as a model for consciousness’

Philosophical Explorations, 18(1):90–103, 2015

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Abstract Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one.

Keywords transparency of experience, phenomenal externalism, internalism, phenomenal consciousness, representationalism