Abstract Situated language and cognition arguably can concern aspects of their environs without mentally representing them. Recently, I have argued that cognition and language can also concern remote situations, as well as general states of affairs, without mental representation. I have illustrated this with thought experiments involving a hypothetical people called the Sundial tribe. As I argue in the present article, such phenomena are not merely a theoretical possibility, but occur routinely in real, ordinary English: Distances and durations are relative to frames of reference, but ordinary English speakers either do not know this, or ignore it in practice. Nevertheless, people can routinely communicate in ordinary English about distances and durations as measured relative to Earth, despite not representing Earth as the frame of reference. Furthermore, provided that we can travel to Mars, ordinary English as we know it will enable us to communicate about distances and durations relative to multiple planets at once, as well as to generalize across heavenly bodies, without mentally representing the relevant reference frames. Our capacity to think and talk without representation therefore does not reduce to our capacity for context-bound, situated cognition, but goes beyond it. The suggested explanation is as follows: (1) situated cognition is fit or adapted to particular environs; (2) these particular environs often instantiate broader patterns, whether natural or artificial ones; and (3) when we encounter additional instances of these patterns, we can often deal with them effectively, in the same way as we deal with the original ones.
Tag: Philosophy of Mind
Displacement and quantification without representation
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Abstract Perry and Recanati have argued that thought and speech can concern entities that they do not represent. This is possible because speakers and thinkers are pragmatically situated within their environs. I argue that thought and speech can go much farther than that. Consider a semi-nomadic tribe who tell the time only by sundials, and who say such things as, “Everywhere we go, we dine at 7”. Their speech and cognition can thus transcend the local environment, and concern remote entities without the aid of either representation, or the context of utterance, or that of assessment.
Teleological functional explanations: a new naturalist synthesis
Acta Biotheoretica, 72 (5):1–22 (2024)
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Abstract The etiological account of teleological function is beset by several difficulties, which I propose to solve by grafting onto the etiological theory a subordinated goal-contribution clause. This approach enables us to ascribe neither too many teleofunctions nor too few; to give a unitary, one-clause analysis that works just as well for teleological functions derived from Darwinian evolution, as for those derived from human intention; and finally, to save the etiological theory from falsification, by explaining how, in spite of appearances, the theory can allow for evolutionary function loss.
‘Stained glass as a model for consciousness’
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Abstract Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one.
Keywords transparency of experience, phenomenal externalism, internalism, phenomenal consciousness, representationalism
‘A new source of data about singular thought’
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Abstract Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they are. I propose, therefore, a methodological contribution, a new source of data about singular thought. We can tell whether a thought is singular if we ask what we can coherently deny at the same time at which we agree with the thought. When we agree with a thought that is general, we cannot coherently deny about the thought’s subject a certain description, the one that occurs in the thought’s subject position. To show how to use this new data source, I develop a linguistic method for testing whether a speaker expresses a singular or a general thought.
Keywords Singular thought, Psychosemantics, Methodology, Agreement, Disagreement